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RECENT CASES
Civil Rights-Exclusion of Wage Earners as a Class
from Jury Service in State Courts Violates
Defendants' Constitutional Rights
Negroes Edgar Labat and Clifton Poret were convicted of aggra-
vated rape of a white woman by an all-white jury of Orleans Parish,
Louisiana, criminal district court. The jury venire contained the names
of Negroes, but at the time of trial no Negro had ever served on a
petit jury in an Orleans Parish criminal case and the one Negro who
had served on a grand jury did so by mistake.' A great number of
potential Negro jurors were eliminated as a result of the practice of
excluding the names of daily wage earners2 from the jury wheel.3
Since forty-seven per cent of the parish's Negro workers were within
the excluded class,4 defendants alleged that the systematic exclusion
of Negroes from jury service denied them equal protection of the law
under the fourteenth amendment.' Denying a petition for writ of
1. Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 586 (1958).
2. LA. R1v. STAT. ANN. § 15:174 (1950) allows exemption from jury service to
attorneys, physicians, school teachers and other groups whose occupations serve similar
public functions. There is no statutory sanction for exemptions to daily wage earners.
Rather, the jury commission clerical staff avoids selecting manual laborers, daily wage
earners and "outside" workers because such workers invariably ask to be excused from
jury duty on the grounds that their absence from work results in a loss of money
(Orleans Parish jurors were not compensated at the time of trial). Although LA. REv.
STAT. Am. § 15:192 (1950) apparently gives judges discretion to decide only upon
the competency of jurors, daily wage earners on the general venire are usually excluded
from the final venire if they so request due to financial hardship. See note 3 infra.
The jury commissioners, thus, seized upon this apparent judge-made policy and
eliminated daily wage earners in advance by excluding their names from the jury
wheel.
3. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:194 (1950) requires maintenance of a jury wheel
(general venire) with the names of at least 750 prospective jurors. From this wheel
the grand jury venire is selected and the petit jury venires are drawn at random.
Seventy-five names are selected from the grand jury venire from which the judge
selects twelve grand jurors. The commission then draws at random 150 names for the
proposed petit jury venire. From this proposed venire the judge selects a final veniro
of about 75, usually asking for volunteers. This is the point at which daily wage
earners included in the general venire can generally ask for and be granted exemption
from jury service.
4. The effect of this exclusion obviously greatly reduced the percentage of Negroes
likely to be called for jury service. Whereas the Orleans Parish Negro population was
32% in the 1950 census, it was stipulated at trial in the instant case that jury com-
missioners since 1936 had certified Negroes as qualified for petit jury venires in numbers
approximately 10% of the venire. A study of a sample of proposed jury veniremen
showed even more blatant Negro underrepresentation. Of 8657 proposed veniremen
studied from 1948 to 1953, an average of 6.2% were Negroes. Of this number 4094
were selected for the final venire, and of these final veniremen, only an average of 3.7%
were Negro.
5. Defense made its motion to quash indictment based on improper venire three
and one-half months before trial, attacking both the grand jury and general venires.
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habeas corpus, a Louisiana federal district court ruled that defendants
had waived their right to object to the jury composition, that race
disproportions on the jury panel were due to adherence to reasonable
state laws, and that there was no proof of systematic exclusion of
Negroes.6 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, held,
reversed. The unexplained absence of Negro jurors and systematic
exclusion of daily wage earners from jury service violate the equal
protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Labat v. Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 35 U.S.
L.W. 3355 (April 11, 1967)Y
The Supreme Court has often enunciated the broad principle that
systematic exclusion of any "definable class" from jury service is a
denial of equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment." The cases so holding, however, have dealt solely with
the exclusion of a racial class from jury service,9 and the long-continued
exclusion of any such group in any jurisdiction raises a prima facie
case of discrimination. 10 Although token inclusion of members of
racial groups on jury venires will not satisfy constitutional require-
ments," proportional representation is not required 2 and an indicting
However, until a writ of habeas corpus was applied for in 1957, every reviewing court
(including the United States Supreme Court, see Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 96
(1955)) treated the attack as solely upon the grand jury venire. Such attack was
procedurally defective as untimely under LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:202 (1950) and
reviewing courts so ruled. The 1957 habeas corpus petition was based in part on new
evidence but also clarified the attack on the general venire. However, the general
venire attack was ignored by reviewing courts until 1960 when the Supreme Court, in
vacating a Fifth Circuit affirmance of denial of writ of habeas corpus, remanded to
district court for "disposition of the question whether members of petitioners' race
were deliberately and intentionally limited and excluded in the selection of petit
jury panels .. " United States ex rel. Poret v Sigler, 361 U.S. 375 (1960).
6. U.S. ex rel. Poret v. Sigler, 234 F. Supp. 171 (E.D. La. 1964).
7. Along with the instant case, the Fifth Circuit sat en bane to decide six other
cases involving similar contentions as to exclusion of Negroes from juries. Rabinowitz
v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966); Jackson v. United States (considered
with Rabinowitz, supra); Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966); Davis v. Davis,
361 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1966); Billingsley v. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1966); Scott
v. Walker, 358 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1966).
8. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). A long line of decisions has
adhered to this principle. See, e.g., Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964);
Eubanks v. Louisiana, supra note 1 (involving Orleans Parish jury system of the
instant case); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587 (1935). For a state court decision applying the rule, see Harper v. State, 251
Miss. 699, 171 So. 2d 129 (1965).
9. See cases cited note 8 supra; Hemandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (involving
exclusion of those with Mexican or Latin American names).
10. Cases cited note 8 supra.
11. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940).
12. See, e.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953).
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or convicting jury need not include a representative of the defendant's
particular class or racial group.'3  Such disparity can be explained,
and a prima facie case rebutted, whenever the state establishes that
exclusion is due to reasons other than racial or class discrimination. 14
Although the rule is clear as to the exclusion of racial classes, doubt
exists as to the constitutionality of class exclusions based on other
factors. In Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,15 the Supreme Court exer-
cised its supervisory power over federal courts to strike down a jury
selection system which discriminated against daily wage earners,
holding that trial by jury "contemplates an impartial jury drawn from
a cross-section of the community." 6 The Court has also used its
supervisory power to strike down federal juries from which women
were excluded because a cross-section was not represented. 17 However,
while some state courts have reached similar conclusions on federal
constitutional grounds,18 the Supreme Court, except in racial cases,
has not specifically held that the cross-section requirement is based on
the Constitution and appears reluctant to interfere with state jury
selection procedures.' 9
Ruling first that the defendants had not waived their objections to
the composition of the jury venires, 20 the Fifth Circuit in the instant
case then turned to a consideration of the jury selection method.
Although the Louisiana jury selection law was found to be non-dis-
13. Cases cited note 12 supra.
14. Patton v. Mississippi, supra note 8.
15. 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
16. 328 U.S. at 220.
17. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946); Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S. 60 (1942). Both cases involved exclusion of women from juries. The Court also
speaks of the cross-section requirement in racial exclusion cases. In Brown v. Allen,
for example, the Court said a jury source list is proper "so long as the source reasonably
reflects a cross-section of the population .... " 344 U.S. at 474.
18. See, e.g., State v. Madison, 240 Md. 265, 213 A.2d 880 (1965); Schowgurow v.
State, 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965). Both cases involved exclusion from the
jury of persons who refused to state they believed in God. See also Allen v. State, 110
Ga. App. 56, 137 S.E.2d 711 (1964), where a white defendant active in Negro voter
registration successfully attacked an array of petit jurors on equal protection and due
process grounds.
19. See Moore v. New York, 333 U.S. 565 (1948) and Fay v. New York, 332 U.S.
261 (1947), upholding convictions by New York "blue ribbon" juries. This statutory
jury is composed of persons qualified by education and background to handle intricate
factual situations and/or difficult legal questions. However, in Fay the Court did point
out that the "blue ribbon" jury statute did not exclude persons on the basis of race,
occupation or economic class.
20. The district court based its denial of writ of habeas corpus alternatively on waiver
of objection to the jury composition and on the merits. The Fifth Circuit found the
waiver question controlled by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), and said absent an
intentional by-pass of a known right, and absent deliberate passing over of a known
procedural requirement, a defendant does not forego his right to assert a constitutional
right in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. 365 F.2d at 710.
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criminatory on its face,2' its administration was said to have abridged
petitioners' fourteenth amendment rights to due process and equal
protection of the law. The court first held that the consistent absence
of Negro jurors raised a prima facie case of discrimination as and that
the state's explanation of a benign exemption to daily wage earners
was insufficient to rebut this inference.P Furthermore, the exemption
practice itself was held to violate the defendants' right to equal pro-
tection and due process by denying them trial by a cross-section of
the community. The proper test for jury selection was said to be the
fairness of the system to defendants, and the economic hardship im-
posed upon prospective jurors was considered irrelevant to the con-
stitutionality of the selection process. Circuit Judge Bell 4 concurred
that the exclusion of daily wage earners was unconstitutional, but he
attributed the absence of Negroes on parish juries to a liberal granting
of excuses for hardship and the volunteer system of jury service,2
rather than to a policy of deliberate exclusion.
Although the Fifth Circuit's holding as to the prima facie case of
discrimination raised by the history of exclusion of Negroes from
jury service is in line with authority,6 the Supreme Court has never
before required a cross-section jury in state courts as a matter of con-
stitutional due process. Since the Fifth Circuit held in the instant case
that the cross-section jury question goes to the very fairness of the
trial,2 7 however, it apparently intends to describe a broader right than
21. The court interpreted LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:174 (1950) as demonstrating
a public policy to require jury service of daily wage earners despite economic hardship,
since the statute enumerated other occupations exempted from jury service for public
policy reasons. 365 F.2d at 727.
22. "The system was neutral, principled, and-foolproof: No Negro ever sat on a
grand jury or a trial jury in Orleans Parish." 365 F.2d at 725.
23. The court said the jury commission had inherited a selection system which had
produced no Negro jurors; that failure to take action to produce some Negroes for
jury service gave rise to a presumption of purposeful discrimination. "Its failure to
change the system amounted to a deliberate decision to continue systematic limitation
of Negroes on the venires." 365 F.2d at 715-16. It should be noted that a Fifth Circuit
decision, Collins v. Walker, 329 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1964), had reversed a conviction
on denial of equal protection grounds due to the purposeful inclusion of Negroes on a
list from which the grand jury was selected. Such a requirement of "color blindness"
would have caused consternation for commissioners faced with a jury system such as
in the instant case since the commissioner would have a duty to select Negroes for
the venire, but be unconscious of race in so doing. The Fifth Circuit rescued com-
missioners from such a dilemma in a case handed down along with the instant case
reversing Collins v. Walker. See Brooks v. Beto, supra note 7 (purposeful inclusion
of Negroes on grand jury held not to violate due process or equal protection).
24. 365 F.2d at 739. Circuit Judge Coleman joined in Judge Bell's concurring opinion.
25. See notes 2 & 3 supra.
26. Cases cited note 8 supra.
27. "The 'very integrity of the fact-finding process' depends on impartial venires
representative of the community as a whole." 365 F.2d at 723.
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that protected by the equal protection clause in the racial exclusion
cases.28 Although ThieP made the jury standard clear for federal
courts, the subsequent enactment of 28 U.S.C. sec. 1863(b) gives
a district judge discretion to excuse a class or group where there is
a finding that jury service would entail undue hardship. This dis-
cretion was vested in district judges in order to conserve court
time by allowing class exclusions to be handled administratively
rather than on a case-by-case basis by judges themselves.30 Orleans
Parish commissioners apparently had such judicial time-saving in
mind in the instant case, but the class exemption here was held
to violate the traditional ideal of a "judgment of [one's] .. . peers."3'
The problem is thus presented of how to assure trial by one's peers,
now defined as a cross-section of the community, without impos-
ing hardship on jurors or unduly burdening courts with numerous
hearings on exemptions from jury service. The best solution, of
course, is to raise juror pay and thereby eliminate the hardship
problem. Unfortunately, most states are not fiscally able to meet such
a burden.32 Until such a solution is possible, the better alternatives
would seem to be either to disallow the class exclusion and require
excuses to be on an individual basis; or, as in the federal courts, to
allow class exclusion on a judge's finding which is open to review.33
The former procedure would still involve some inconvenience to a
hardship class, and both alternatives would require court time. Either
method, however, would protect the cross-section standard better than
28. Under the Fifth Circuit reasoning, anyone would have standing to attack a
jury system which systematically excluded a class or group; whereas, in the equal
protection cases, the courts have difficulty in finding standing to challenge an array for
one not a member of the class or group discriminated against. See Allen v. State, supra
note 18.
29. Supra note 15.
30. United States v. Flynn, 216 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1954).
31. Magna Carta ch. 39.
32. Current per diem rates paid jurors in Southern states are: Alabama, $6 per day,
A. A. CODE tit. 11, § 98 (1959); Arkansas, $7.50 per day, Anu. STAT. ANN. § 39-301
(1956); Florida, $5 per day, FLA. STAT. ANN § 40.24 (1961); Georgia, $2 to $10 per
day (rate fixed by first grand jury of court term), GA. CODE: ANN. § 59-120 (1965);
Louisiana still lets each parish set juror compensation, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.8
(1950); Mississippi, $8 per day, Miss. CODE ANN. § 3959 (Supp. 1964); North Caro-
lina, $3 to $8 per day (rate fixed by jury commissioners), N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-5
(Supp. 1965); South Carolina provides for juror compensation on a county-by-county
basis with rates ranging from $2 to $7.50 per day with one county paying $10 per
day, S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-308 (Supp. 1965); Tennessee, $8 per day, TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 22-401 (Supp. 1966); Virginia, $5 per day, VA. CODE ANN. § 8-204 (Supp. 1966).
In addition, most states allow jurors minimal travel and some other expenses.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b) (1964). The Fifth Circuit in a companion case to the
instant case said the daily wage earner class could possibly be exempted from jury
service on the basis of this statute, but that such exemption would require an
appropriate finding and with appropriate limitations. Rabinowitz v. United States, .supra
note 7, at 54 n.49.
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a selection system similar to that of the instant case. If a cross-section
venire is indeed a constitutional requirement, the additional problem
arises as to how representative the cross-section selection must be.4
Although city directories, telephone books, voter lists, tax records
and other similar compilations are used by state jury commissioners,
none assure a perfect cross-section of the community.m The Supreme
Court noted the problem in Brown v. Allen3 6 where it approved a tax
list as juror source since it was the most comprehensive list available
short of a census or required registration; and in its most recent deci-
sion in the area, 7 the Court refused to impose a rigid source list stan-
dard, stating that an imperfect jury selection system was not equivalent
to discrimination. Therefore, although it was quite possible for the
instant case to be used to impose on state courts the cross-section
requirement now demanded of federal juries, it was unlikely that the
Court would use this case to require a higher source list standard.
However, since the Fifth Circuit's instant decision as to exclusion of
Negroes from jury service was clearly correct, it is not surprising
that the Supreme Court forewent a resolution of even the cross-section
issue by denying certiorari.
34. Even federal courts have not required that the jury venire be a perfect cross-
section of the community. See Padgett v. Buxton-Smith Mercantile Co., 283 F.2d 597
(loth Cir. 1960).
35. Non-city residents are not included in city directories, not all persons have
telephones, nor are all registered to vote, nor do all pay taxes. Another popular
source of prospective jurors, the 'key man' system, is limited by the number of
acquaintances of several 'key men' from different sections of a state, district or county
who are asked to suggest names of prospective jurors. This system is described in
Padgett v. Buxton-Smith Mercantile Co., supra note 34.
36. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
37. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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International Law and Trademark Infringement-
Rights of Former Owners of Confiscated Cuban
Businesses Under Hickenlooper Amendment
The interventors' of five confiscated Cuban cigar companies brought
suit to restrain the prosecution of actions instituted on behalf of the
former owners of the cigar companies, and to have the interventors'
attorneys substituted as counsel for plaintiffs in each of the actions.
The suits had been brought against the United States importers2 to
recover the value of Cuban cigars sold and delivered to the importers
after the confiscation, and for alleged trademark infringement. The
former owners contended that they were entitled to the money due
on the goods because the Cuban decrees under which the businesses
were confiscated violated international law, thereby permitting re-
covery under the Hickenlooper amendment3 on the merits of the
claim. The interventors urged restraint of the suits on the grounds that
the federal act of state doctrine4 precluded a determination of the
validity of the Cuban decrees or the trademark rights of the businesses
involved. On a motion for summary judgment in the federal district
court, held, confiscation by a state of the property of its own nationals
does not constitute a violation of international law under the Hicken-
1. The interventors (spelling adopted from the Cuban Decree) were designated by
the Cuban government to operate the businesses taken over by the government on
Sept. 15, 1960. The former owners were ousted from control under Cuban Law No.
647, Nov. 24, 1959, as amended by Law No. 843, July 6, 1960.
2. Apparently apprehensive of double liability, the importers in the United States
failed to pay the purchase price for cigars shipped after the take-over.
3. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c)
(2) (1964): "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States
shall decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination
on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which
a claim of title or other right is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or
a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation
or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the
principles of international law, including the principles of compensation and the other
standards set out in this subsection: Provided, that this subparagraph shall not be
applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to
international law or with respect to a claim of title or other right acquired pursuant
to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180 days duration issued in good
faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with
respect to which the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine
is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the United States
and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court, or (3)
in any case in which the proceedings are commenced after January 1, 1966."
4. The most frequently quoted statement of this doctrine is: "[E]very sovereign
State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of




looper amendment and interventors are entitled to enjoin the suit of
the former owners challenging the validity of the Cuban decrees.'
Similar confiscation of trademark benefits, however, is not protected by
the act of state doctrine where the situs 6 of the trademark and the good
will symbolized by it are in the United States, and previous owners
may therefore proceed in the United States with the suit for trade-
mark infringement. F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp.
481 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
In its simplest terms, the act of state doctrine provides that the
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the public acts of
another country committed within its own territory.7 The original
reason for the doctrine appears to be deference to the principle of the
absolute sovereignty of nations,8 but courts in the United States have
also considered international comity, domestic separation of powers,
and possible embarrassment to the executive in its conduct of foreign
affairs as reasons for application of the doctrine.9 The major criticism
5. The Hickenlooper amendment excludes application "in any case in which an
act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law." Foreign Assistance Act
of 1964, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1964).
6. Here situs means location with regard to whether the trademark is located in
the country of the main foreign business or whether it is located in the country in
which it is registered and where its good will exists.
7. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
8. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909); The Schooner
Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812); Reeves, The Sabbatino Case:
The Supreme Court of the United States Rejects a Proposed New Theory of Sovereign
Relations and Restores the Act of State Doctrine, 32 FoPnDnrar L. REv. 631, 633 (1964);
Note, 44 N.C.L. REv. 466, 468 (1966). The act of state doctrine and the doctrine of
sovereign immunity are distinguishable. The act of state doctrine is open as a defense
to private litigants who may have obtained expropriated property from the acting govern-
ment. The defense of sovereign immunity, however, is not open to the private litigant
and can only be used by the sovereign or one of its agents who has acted in his official
capacity. House, The Law Gone Awry: Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres, 37 CALrF.
L. Ruv. 38, 50 (1949).
9. The doctrine rests on comity or "courtesy among nations," and not to apply it
may "vex the peace of nations." United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S- 324, 328 (1937);
Shapleigh v. Mier, 83 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1936). Foreign relations is a "political
question" requiring judicial restraint. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297
(1918). In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), and
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918), the Court applied the doctrine
and denied recovery, taking judicial notice of the State Department's political recogni-
tion of the foreign governments involved, which had the effect of retroactively validating
the previous acts of the foreign governments. See 110 CONG. REc. 19546 (1964) (re-
marks of Senator Hickenlooper). The "Bernstein exception" to the act of state doctrine,
arising initially out of confiscations by Nazi Germany, permits the judiciary to pass
on the validity of foreign confiscatory decrees where the executive branch of the
government has authorized them to do so. Bernstein v. N. V. Nederllandsche-Ameri-
kaansche Stoomvaart-Maatshappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). The act of state
doctrine with the "Bernstein exception" was apparently controlling until 1964. Kane v.
National Institute of Agrarian Reform, 18 Fla. Supp. 116 (Cir. Ct. 1961). As is
indicated in Note, 44 N.C.L. REv-" 466, 471 (1966), the full effect of Bernstein was
never known since it was not appealed to the Supreme Court because of an approved
1967 ]
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of the doctrine has been that it permits decrees of foreign countries
which are contrary to the public policy and laws of the United
States to go unchallenged in United States' courts.10 In 1964 the
Supreme Court of the United States, in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino,1 extended the act of state doctrine to apply even where
there was a possible violation of international law.'2 Dissatisfied with
this result, Congress enacted the Hickenlooper amendment 13 which
settlement. Cases applying the doctrine prior to Bernstein include: Underhill v.
Hernandez, supra note 7 (Venezuelan revolutionary government); Banco de Espana v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940) (Spanish Loyalist government);
Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 237 App. Div. 686, 262 N.Y.S. 693 (1st Dcp't
1933) (Russian revolution).
10. A decree under which there is confiscation without compensation is obviously
contrary to the public policy of the United States. In discussing the original Bernstein
case, in which Bernstein was denied recovery on the act of state doctrine, Zandcr
argues: "Though there was no international delinquency in question (as the plaintiff
was a German citizen at the time of the forced transfer), surely this was a case
when the doctrine of public policy would have been safely and opportunely applied
to strike out the defense based on the objectionable law...." Zander, The Act of
State Doctrine, 53 Ais. J. INTL'. L. 826, 833 (1959); Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Frt-r6s
Soci6t6 Anonyme6, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947). The
act of state doctrine has also been criticized from the standpoint that it is based on
questionable precedents. It is argued that most of the early decisions on which the courts
rely involved only sovereigns immunity from personal suit, not the acts of a foreign
state. See 57 YALE L.J. 108 (1947).
11. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). All aspects of the Sabbatino litigation, from the time of
worsening relations with Cuba and the United States to the decision by the Supreme
Court are discussed in Reeves, supra note 8. Reeves commends the result reached by
the Supreme Court, concluding that the new rule of law adopted by the lower courts
would have "impaired the sovereignty" of the United States. Snyder, Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino: The Supreme Court Speaks, 16 SYAcusE L. R.v. 15 (1964)
criticizes the result reached by the Supreme Court, emphasizing the harmful effects the
decision may have on future investments in newly developing foreign nations. The
decision is also criticized in Stevenson, The State Department and Sabbatino: "Ev'n
Victors Are by Victories Undone," 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 707 (1964). The constitutional
aspects of the Supreme Court's decision are discussed in Henkin, The Forcign Affairs
Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 CoUrM. L. Rzv. 805 (1964). The decisions
of the lower courts are discussed in Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of
Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16 RUTGEaS L. REv. 1 (1961) (district court), and Stevenson, The
Sabbatino Case-Three Steps Forward and Two Steps Back, 57 AM. J. INT' L. 97
(1963) (court of appeals). See also Lillich, A Pyrrhic Victory at Foley Square: The
Second Circuit and Sabbatino, 8 Vr. .L. REv. 155 (1963); Paul, The Act of State
Doctrine: Revived but Suspended, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 691 (1965).
12. The district court found the confiscatory decrees to be in violation of international
law. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The
court pointed out that no court in the United States has passed on the question of
whether a court could examine the validity of the act under international lawv and
refuse recognition to the act if it were in violation of international law. The court went
on to hold that the Cuban act violated international law because it was retaliatory,
discriminatory, and without compensation. The court of appeals affirmed. 307 F.2d
845 (2d Cir. 1962).
13. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 301(d) (4), 78 Stat. 1009, 22 U.S.C. §
2370(e) (2) (1964). The amendment originally applied to the period January 1, 1959,
to January 1, 1966. It is now permanent law. 79 Stat. 653, § 301(d)(2) (1965).
[ VOL. 20
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encouraged the courts to determine on the merits cases involving
foreign confiscation of property of American citizens. On remand of
Sabbatino, the district court held the amendment constitutional and,
applying it retroactively to the facts of the case,14 found a violation
of international law and held for the defendants.15 The amendment
is not to be applied, however, when the court determines there is no
violation of the "principles of international law, including principles
of compensation," ' 6 but the "principles" referred to have not as yet
been clearly defined.
When a foreign manufacturer whose business has been confiscated
attempts to enforce a claim for trademark infringement 8 in the United
States, the defense usually offered is that any right in the trademark
and its good will passed to the foreign government when the business
was nationalized. Courts agreeing with this defense apply the indi-
visible or unitary theory of good will, 9 reasoning that American
trademarks originate from use, not registration, and that the trade-
marks in question are symbolic of the good will of the main foreign
14. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). For a
good discussion of this case, see Note, 44 N.C.L. REv. 466 (1966). The court applied
the amendment retroactively even though Senator Hickenlooper stated that "It does not
change the result in that [Sabbatino] case. ... 110 CONG. REC. 19557 (1964).
15. The Cuban representatives were plaintiffs seeking to recover the money due for
sugar to which they had obtained title under a decree the court found in violation of
international law. Therefore, the defense based on the Hickenlooper amendment was
held valid, and the complaint of the Cuban representatives dismissed.
16. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, § 301(d) (4), 78 Stat. 1009, 22 U.S.C. § 2370
(e) (2) (1964).
17. The instant case is the third interpretation of the amendment. American
Hawaiian Ventures, Inc. v. Latuharhary, 257 F. Supp. 622 (D.N.J. 1966) was a libel
in admiralty for alleged tortious conversion. The libelant asserted that the Hickenlooper
amendment deprived Indonesia of any claim to sovereign immunity. The court did
not discuss the amendment in any detail, and held that it did not bear on the real
question of whether the court's jurisdiction over Indonesia would be defeated by its
right to sovereign immunity for acts lure imperi. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Farr, supra note 14.
18. The primary and proper purpose of a trademark is to identify the origin of the
article to which the trademark is affixed, and protect the good will established in the
particular trade or business. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412
(1915). In order to assert the right to enjoin others from using a trademark in the
United States, a person must establish his ownership rights in the trademark through
use in a United States business. Rogers v. Ercona Camera Corp., 277 F.2d 94 (D.C.
Cir. 1960). This requirement is met for a foreign manufacturer when he gives an
importer formal rights in trademark registration. E. Leitz, Inc. v. Watson, 152 F.
Supp. 631 (D.D.C. 1957). See Callmann, Worldmarks and the Antitrust Law, 11 VAID.
L. REv. 515, 520 (1958).
19. Callmann, supra note 18. "Good will can no more be separated from a business
that reputation from a person. Good will is the business as it is viewed by others ...
Good will may be wider in scope than the business itself. The good will of a business
may embrace territories where neither the business nor its salesmen have ever been.
The situs of the good will, wherever it may be, is the situs of the business." 1
CALLmAN, UNFAm CoMrmi oN AND TAmE-MA xS 26 (2d ed. 1950).
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business and not of the American establishment or branch. The situs
of the trademark and its good will is therefore the situs of the foreign
business.20 However, the "indivisible unity" theory has not been ap-
plied in the more recent cases, and there is some indication that it
has been abandoned.21 Courts rejecting the "unity" theory hold that
trademarks registered in the United States Patent Office, and the good
will symbolized by them, have their situs in the' territory where
United States law is enforceable.22 It is felt that to hold otherwise,
particularly in a case of confiscation without compensation, would
give extraterritorial effect to the foreign law, which is a violation of the
public policy and law of the United States.23
The court in the instant case found that the confiscations of the
property of Cuban nationals24 was not a violation of international law,
thereby limiting a determination of a violation of international law
for the purposes of the Hickenlooper amendment to traditional inter-
pretations of that field. The court noted that such decrees are con-
trary to the public policy of the United States,25 but, notwithstanding
the equities of the case, it felt constrained under Sabbatino to apply
the act of state doctrine.26 The court further concluded that the former
owners' right to conduct business in the United States includes the
right to make use of the good will already established in the United
States, of which the trademarks are an integral part.27 To allow the
trademark rights to be detached from the good will would be to give
an impermissible extraterritorial effect to the Cuban decrees. The
former owners, therefore, could pursue claims for trademark infringe-
ment, although final determination would not be made on this motion.
20. Soci6t6 Vinicole de Champagne v. Mumm Champagne & Importation Co., 10 F.
Supp. 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
21. Abel, Confiscation and Trademarks, 44 TRADEMrArm REP. 1279 (1954).
22. Roger & Gallet v. Janmarie, Inc., 245 F.2d 505 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
23. Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U.S. 580, 596 (1911). See also Colinson, Sabbattno:
The Treatment of International Law in the United States Courts, 3 COLUm. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 27, 35 (1964).
24. The court noted that all five businesses were Cuban entities, organized under
Cuban law and doing business in Cuba, and that none of the shareholders or officers
was a citizen of the United States at the time of the intervention. F. Palicio y Compania,
S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
25. With regard to the possibility of giving extraterritorial effect to the decrees, the
court said that because the interventors were claiming only the price of cigars shipped
after the intervention, there was no property involved that was within the United States
at the time of the confiscation which would have presented any danger of giving
extraterritorial effect to the decrees. Id. at 492.
26. The court acknowledged that by allowing the interventors to sue it was "imple-
menting and enforcing decrees which are abhorrent to our own policy and laws." 256 F.
Supp. at 489.
27. The court noted that the former owners had continued to carry on some business
in the United States in the names of their expropriated businesses, and had taken
"prompt steps to enforce any trademark rights they might have." 256 F. Supp. at 492.
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The court in Brush rejected a potentially extensive application of
the Hickenlooper amendment and applied an accepted principle of
international law in holding that the legality of the Cuban govern-
ment's actions with regard to its own nationals could not be tested
by international legal standards. The court's holding indicates that the
acts of the confiscating country must be more than merely contrary to
public policy of the United States in order to constitute a violation
of international law under the Hickenlooper amendment. While the
result reached by the court on the additional issue of trademark
infringement was correct, it might better have based its decision
solely upon grounds of federal trademark policya rather than upon a
determination of the situs of the trademark. Even though the former
owners have attempted to continue business under the same name in
the United States, the existing trademark and good will are based on
the use of Cuban tobacco, a commodity no longer available to the for-
mer owners. The actual situs of the trademark should be with the
business able to produce the cigars with Cuban tobacco, i.e., the
business now run by the interventors. However, since the interventors
now control the business under a decree contrary to the policy aid
laws of the United States, they should not be able to take advantage of
trademark good will developed in the United States and to create
confusion in the American public as to the source of the goods.
Under this reasoning, the former owners may enjoin the importation
of cigars bearing the old trademark not because they maintain rights
to the trademark, but because utilization of it by the interventors
violates federal trademark policy.
Jurisdiction-Minimum" Contacts-First Amendment
Requires a Greater Showing of Contact in a Libel
Action To Satisfy Due Process Than Is Necessary
in Other Types of Actions
Plaintiff, a public official,1 sued the New York Times for libel in an
Alabama federal district court as a result of a story which had been
"gathered" in Alabama by a full-time reporter of the defendant. The
defendant objected to the court's jurisdiction on the grounds that its
28. See 1 NIMs, UNFAIR CO.MPETITION AND TRADEMARKS 36 (4th ed. 1947).
1. The plaintiff, Mr. Eugene "Bull" Conner, was a City Commissioner of Birming-
ham, Alabama.
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limited advertising solicitation, 2 news-gathering activities, 3 and distri-
bution procedures4 in Alabama fell short of the minimum contacts re-
quired for purposes of judicial jurisdiction under the due process clause
and the first amendment.5 The district court upheld service of process
under Alabama's long-arm statute6 and entered judgment upon a jury
verdict for plaintiff. On appea 7 to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit, held, reversed. When jurisdiction is asserted over a foreign
newspaper corporation in a libel action, the first amendment requires
a greater degree of contact with the forum state to satisfy due process
than is required in suits arising from other tortious activities.8 New
York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966).
The modem trend toward expansion of judicial jurisdiction began
with International Shoe Co. v. Washington,9 in which the Supreme
Court held that jurisdiction over a foreign corporation would be upheld
upon a finding of sufficient "minimum contacts" so as not to offend
traditional notions of "fair play and substantial justice."10 While the
corporate activity in International Shoe was "continuous" and "syste-
matic," issuance of a single re-insurance policy was later held sufficient
to satisfy due process in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co."
A year after its decision in McGee, however, the Court cautioned that
"It is a mistake to assume that this trend... [of liberality] heralds the
2. Advertising solicitation in Alabama represented from 25/1000 to 46/1000 of 1%
of total advertising revenue.
3. Staff correspondents had been to Alabama seven times during the period in
dispute (April 1, 1959 to August 22, 1960), in addition to the 5-day visit by Harrison
Salisbury to gather the information for the allegedly libellous story.
4. Average daily circulation in Alabama was 395 copies of a total of 650,000. Alabama
accounted for 2455 of 1,300,000 copies of the Sunday Times. New York Times Co. v.
Conner, 365 F.2d 567, 570 (5th Cir. 1966).
5. Id. at 569.
6. A.A. CODE tit. 7, § 199(1) (Supp. 1965) provides: "Service on nonresident
doing business or performing work or service in state.-Any . . . corporation not quali-
fied under the . . . laws of this state as to doing business herein, who shall do any
business .. . in this state shall, by the doing of such business . . . be deemed to have
appointed the secretary of state . . . to be the true and lawful attorney or agent of
such nonresident, upon whom process may be served in any action accrued or ac-
cruing, or resulting from the doing of such business . . . or as an incident thereof by
any such nonresident, or his, its or their agent, servant or employee."
7. This is the third appeal of this case to the Fifth Circuit. For the prior history
see 365 F.2d at 568-69.
8. Defendant's second contention on appeal was that the jury's finding of actual
malice was not supported by any evidence. The Fifth Circuit recognized that the
jury was properly instructed under the standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), but after examining the evidence in detail, it concluded that
"it is obvious that such evidence does not even approach the stringent requirements
for showing actionable libel of a public official." 365 F.2d at 576.
9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
10. Id. at 320.
11. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state
courts."'2 Despite this word of warning, courts have continued to
construe state long-arm statutes liberally, and have held a single plane
crash 3 and the shipment of a single defective product into the state14
to be sufficient contact toestablish jurisdiction under the International
Shoe test. However, courts have generally. required more than a single
contact where jurisdiction over a newspaper corporation is in issue;'"
for example, several courts have indicated that distribution of a small
percentage of the publication in the forum state will not alone subject
the publisher to extra-territorial jurisdiction. 6 Where such factors as
advertising and news solicitation are present in addition to distribution,
there is a conflict as to whether there has been sufficient contact within
the state. On the premise that its statute was as broad as due process
would permit, the Alabama Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,17 held that jurisdiction based upon such contacts did not
violate due process.'8 Yet the Fifth Circuit in Buckley v. New York
Times Co.,'9 found insufficient contact under similar circumstances
even though the Louisiana long-arm statute20 was as broad as per-
missible under due process.2' Until the instant case, however, no
court had relied upon the first amendment as a basis for invalidating
extra-territorial jurisdiction over a newspaper corporation.
In examining the contacts of the defendant with Alabama in the
instant case, the court concluded that the Buckley decision, which had
12. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
13. Elkhart Eng'r Corp. v. Dorier Werke, 343 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1965).
14. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 2 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
15. The Supreme Court has had the opportunity to decide this question on two
occasions. Polizzi v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 345 U.S. 663 (1953); New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 8. In Polizzi the majority chose to rest its decision on a
general venue statute. Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Jackson in dissent,
would have found the defendant publisher doing business in the state sufficient for
jurisdiction. However, the defendant had a circulation in the state of nearly 50,000
copies, in addition to a full time agent. 345 U.S. at 667-70. In Sullivan the Court felt
foreclosed from reviewing the jurisdictional issue since the Alabama Supreme Court
had held that the Times had put in a general appearance. 376 U.S. at 264 n.4.
16. See, e.g., Insull v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 273 F.2d 166, 170 (7th
Cir. 1959); Street & Smith Publications, Inc. v. Spikes, 120 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 653 (1941); Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 432,
441, 96 S.E.2d 445, 452-53 (1957).
17. 273 Ala. 656, 670, 144 So. 2d 25, 34 (1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S.
254 (1964).
18. Id. at 669, 144 So. 2d at 33. The activities of the Times in Sullivan were al-
most identical to those in the instant case. See id. at 665-66, 144 So. 2d at 29-30.
19. 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964).
20. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3471(1) (Supp. 1965).
21. Buckley v. New York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470, 475 (5th Cir. 1964). For the
Times' circulation and solicitation activities in Louisiana, see id. at 473-74. For a
comparison with those in Alabama, see note 3 supra.
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held similar contacts insufficient to satisfy due process, was control-
ling.- The court rejected the contention that the Alabama statute was
broader than the Louisiana statute since Buckley had defined the outer
limits of due process; the court said this delimitation could not be
expanded by the Alabama court's interpretation of its statute in
Sullivan.P Furthermore, in distinguishing an Alabama tort case where
jurisdiction was based upon a single plane crash,24 the court held that
first amendment considerations in a libel action required a greater
showing of contacts to support jurisdiction than in a normal tort
situation.2 To support this conclusion, it examined two cases in which
the Supreme Court invalidated state regulation in areas where possible
abuse by the state would encroach on first amendment freedoms.
26
The majority felt that "the restriction on the exercise of jurisdiction
over non-resident newspaper corporations imposed by Buckley should
be viewed in the same light."2 The dissent urged that Buckley was
not controlling and emphasized that in Buckley the Associated Press
had gathered the material, while in the instant case a Times reporter
was sent to Alabama expressly to report the story. Since the dissent
concluded that the Associated Press was not an agent of the Times,28
the only contact with Louisiana in Buckley was the distribution of
papers there, while in the instant case the alleged libel "grew out of
the calculated and directed activities of an accredited agent of the
Times within the State of Alabama."'
The effect of the decision in the instant case is to present the plain-
tiff in a libel action with significant jurisdictional barriers where the
defendant is an out-of-state newspaper corporation. While the United
States Supreme Court decision in Sullivan prevents public officials from
using the substantive law of libel to thwart the first amendment free-
doms of expression and criticism, the instant case goes even further
by discouraging the very initiation of a libel action 0 In reaching its
decision, the Fifth Circuit could have relied upon an examination of
22. 365 F.2d at 571.
23. Ibid. Application of a federal interpretation of a state statute is correct when
the interpretation given it by the state court infringes on constitutional rights. Arrow-
smith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963).
24. Elkhart Eng'r Corp. v. Dornier Werke, supra note 13, at 865.
25. 365 F.2d at 572.
26. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Virginia statute regulating business
solicitation by the legal profession); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936) (state taxation of non-resident newspaper corporations).
27. 365 F.2d at 573.
28. The majority felt that AP was as much an agent of defendant as one of its
own reporters. Id. at 570.
29. Id. at 581.
30. Thus plaintiff loses the harrassment value of a libel action.
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other factors typically considered in determining jurisdiction,31 bulf
instead it chose to make explicit the role of the first amendment in
deciding the question. The court may well have reached the correct
result, since a literal application of the single contact rule often used
in personal injury actions33 would subject the publisher to long-arm
jurisdiction upon the shipment into a state of a single newspaper.
Applying the rule of the instant case, therefore, protects both the
publisher, and the public's interest in reading critical expressions on
the conduct of public officials. In its zeal to protect first amendment
rights, however, the court failed to articulate the answers to questions
posed by the existence of significant competing values. Certainly at
some point a public official should be allowed to sue a foreign news-
paper corporation.3 Since the court provided no guidance as to when
such a point might be reached, however, a plaintiff with a meritorious
cause of action may be denied access to a convenient tribunal. In
addition, the court's reliance upon the first amendment presents the
question of whether its decision is to be limited to suits involving
public officials, 36 or whether the same considerations apply in every
31. For application of some of these factors, see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957) (interest of the state in providing a forum for its residents
and availability of witnesses and evidence); Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339
U.S. 643, 647-49 (1950) (interest of the state in regulating the business involved
and ease of access to an alternative forum); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (extent to which the cause of action arose out of defendant's
local activities); Buckley v. New York Times Co., supra note 19, at 474-75 (character
of the parties); Allied Finance Co. v. Prosser, 103 Ga. App. 538, 119 S.E.2d 813
(1961) (character of the parties).
32. To justify applying the first amendment to broaden due process requirements in
libel actions, the court advanced a series of cases in which the Supreme Court had
used the first amendment as a limitation on state power. Since the acquisition of
jurisdiction over a non-resident is an exercise of power by the state, these cases may
be at least analogous. See Hanson v. Denckla, supra note 12, at 251; Comment, 26
TEmP. L. REv. 379 (1959).
33. See Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., supra note 14.
34. The instant court indicated that to hold otherwise would "'freeze out of
existence' the distribution on a limited basis of publications espousing unpopular
positions .... " 365 F.2d at 573.
35. This follows logically from the Sullivan case itself, which would permit a
public official to recover once the conduct and intent of the defendant dropped below
a certain level.
36. It would seem that some of the reasons advanced in the opinion would lose
their significance when applied to such a situation. The whole concept of liberality
of expression provided by the Sullivan decision is based on the premise that the
public should have the fullest information about their public officials. This problem is
vividly illustrated in a statement by Judge Friendly, speaking for the Second Circuit in
Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 35 U.S.L. Wms 2427 (2d Cir. Jan. 10, 1967):
"We cannot but wonder whether the Conner court would have felt the same way if
the dramatis personae, instead of being 'Bull' Conner and a newspaper internationally
known for its high standards, had been an esteemed local educator or clergyman and
an out-of-state journal with a taste for scandal which had circulated 395 copies of a
libel stating he had corrupted the morals of the young."
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libel action against a foreign newspaper corporation.7 It should be
noted that subsequent to the instant decision, the Second Circuit, in
Buckley v. New York Post Corp.,38 rejected the contention that in a
libel action the first amendment required greater contacts to satisfy
due process. The court indicated that if publishers were to receive
procedural protections in addition to substantive ones, these protec-
tions should not go to jurisdiction, "which must exist quite as much
when ... [the defendant] circulates a libel within the state as when
he sends a leaking can of poison there ... ,"9 Rather, the first amend-
ment would be employed to decide if a state could exercise this juris-
diction in a particular case. It is submitted that a more logical ap-
proach would be to discard entirely the use of the first amendment
in determining jurisdiction, and adopt an International Shoe ap-
proach.40 It would seem that when the defendant has engaged in a
reasonable amount of activity within the state, it should expect to
accept the burdens of a lawsuit as an incident of doing business.
Applying this test to the instant case, there is no reason why a news-
paper should be treated any differently for jurisdictional purposes
than any other business, particularly in light of the substantive pro-
tections already afforded newspapers under the case law.
41
37. Additionally, the court seems to have failed to give sufficient consideration to
whether it was necessary to apply the first amendment to strengthen the jurisdictional
barriers to a libel suit, since the publisher has already the substantive protection of the
Sullivan case. The single publication rule, adopted in a majority of states, provides some
added protection by treating the publication as complete when the publisher finishes
and releases the publication. Thus there is no re-publication when it goes into another
state. PnossEa, ToRTs 788 (3d ed. 1964). New York has excluded non-resident pub-
lishers from the operation of its long-arm statute. N.Y. Civ. PsAuc. § 302(a) (1963).
38. 35 U.S.L. WEEK 2427 (2d Cir. Jan. 10, 1967).
39. This appears to be a distinction without a difference. The Fifth Circuit would
use the first amendment to expand the minimum contacts required by due process,
while the Second Circuit would apply a uniform rule for contacts but would use the
first amendment as a limitation of the exercise of this admitted jurisdiction. Both ap-
proaches arrive at the same result: the nature of the cause of action and the character
of the parties cause the contacts necessary for jurisdiction to vacillate.
40. Increasing the contacts necessary for a public official to bring a libel action
seems to create a presumption that the paper acted properly, and thus should not be
faced with the task of defending a lawsuit, and that the plaintiff has really sustained
no injury and thus should be denied access to court.
41. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 254; New York Times Co. v.
Conner, 365 F.2d at 567 (decision on the merits).
1967] RECENT CASES
Labor Law-Attorney Undertaking Persuader Activity
on Behalf of Employer Must Report Such
Activity Under LMRDA
Plaintiff attorneys engaged in various activities on behalf of em-
ployer clients designed to persuade employees not to unionize. The
plaintiffs' activities included speaking to assembled groups of em-
ployees, interrogating them about their sympathies, and generally con-
ducting anti-union campaigns for employers. The attorneys sought a
declartory judgment in federal.district court that they not be required
to file reports of these "persuader activities" under the Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.1 Plaintiffs conceded that
they had engaged in persuader activities as defined in section 203(b)
of the act, but contended that their activities were within the ex-
ceptions provided in sections 203(c) and 204. The Secretary of Labor
counterclaimed to require the attorneys to file a section 203(b) report,
contending that neither of the above sections exempted the attorneys
from the act's reporting requirements. The district court rejected the
Secretary's position and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary
judgment.2 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
1. 73 Stat. 519-46 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1959). Pertinent portions of
the LMRDA (popularly known as the Landrum-Griffin Act) are as follows:
Section 203:
"(b) Every person who pursuant to any agreement or arrangement with an employer
undertakes activities where an object thereof is, directly or indirectly-
"(1) to persuade employees to exercise or not to exercise, or to-persuade employees
as to the manner of exercising, the right to organize and bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing; or
"(2) to supply an employer with information concerning the activities of employees
or a labor organization in connection with a labor dispute ...
"shall file within thirty days after entering into such agreement or arrangement a
report with the Secretary ... containing the name under which such person is engaged
in doing business and the address of its principal office, and a detailed statement of
the terms and conditions of such agreement or arrangement. Every such person shall
file annually, with respect to each fiscal year during which payments were made as a
result of such an agreement or arrangement, a report with the Secretary .. . con-
taining a statement (A) of its receipts of any kind from employers on account of
labor relations advice or services, designating the sources thereof, and (B) of its
disbursements of any kind, in connection with such services and the purposes thereof....
"(c) Nothing in this section shall be consrued to require any employer or any other
person to file a report covering the services of such person by reason of his giving or
agreeing to give advice to such employer or representing or agreeing to represent
such employer before any court, administrative agency, or tribunal of arbitration or
engaging or agreeing to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of such employer.....
Section 204:
"Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to require an attorney . . . to,
include in any report ...any information which was lawfully communicated to such
attorney by any of his clients in the course of a legitimate attorney-client relationship."
2. Fowler v. Wirtz, 236 F. Supp. 22 (5.D. Fla. 1964). Finding that the attorneys
were at all times representing employers on legal matters within the attorney-client
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
held, reversed in part. Attorneys who undertake, on behalf of em-
ployers, to dissuade employees from joining a union must file a report
required by section 203(b); but the reporting requirement does not
extend to dealings with other labor clients for whom they have ren-
dered no persuader services. Wirtz v. Fowler, 4 CCH LAB. L. REP.. (54
CCH Lab. Cas.) 11514, at 17661 (5th Cir. Oct. 19, 1966).
Although the greatest significance of the Labor-Management Re-
porting and Disclosure Act of 1959 lies in its regulation of internal
affairs of labor unions, 3 certain provisions of the act also regulate
labor relations activities of employers and their consultants.4 Section
203(b) requires labor relations consultants who undertake "persuader
activities" on behalf of employer clients to report the arrangement to
the Secretary of Labor within thirty days. The report must include a
"detailed statement of the terms and conditions of such agreement or
arrangement," and must specify the amount the consultant is receiving
for such services, who is paying him, how much he is spending in
connection with the services, and for what purposes it is being spent.
In addition, section 203(b) requires that an annual report be sub-
mitted. Sections 203(c) and 204 enumerate the exceptions to the gen-
eral reporting requirement. The mere giving of advice to an employer
or the representation of an employer in an arbitration, administrative,
or judicial proceeding need not be reported under section 203(c);
and information protected by the attorney-client privilege is exempted
under section 204.5 In Douglas v. Wirtz6 and Price v. Wirtz,7 the
attorneys conceded that they performed some reportable persuader
activities under section 203(b), but argued that they were not re-
relationship and that the affected employees were apprised that the attorneys rep-
resented their employers, -the district court concluded that the attorneys were "ex-
pressly exempted" from the reporting requirements because of the "explicit provisions"
of § 203(c) and § 204.
3. Beaird, Reporting Requirements For Employers and Labor Relations Consultants
in the Labor-Mahdgement Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 53 CEO. L.J. 267
(1965).
4. The term "consultant" as used in the act includes all attorneys engaged in labor-
relations work. A contrary interpretation of the term would render § 204 (which
exempts an attorney from reporting matters within the attorney-client relationship)
meaningless. Also, a proposed amendment which would have specifically excluded an
attorney engaged in the practice of law from the reporting requirements was rejected.
105 CoNG. R c. 6555-56 (1959).
5. A similar reporting provision of the Federal Lobbying Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 839
(1946), 2 U.S.C. § 261 (1958), was upheld as constitutional in United States v.
Hairris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). The instant court cited this case in rejecting the plaintiffs'
contention that the act's reporting requirement voilated their freedom of speech. For
d discussion of the lower court's decision in the instant case and its "inordinate con-
cern" with free speech, see Comment, 40 N.Y.U.L. RPv. 366 (1965)."6. 353 F.2d 30 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 909 (1966).
7.,51 CCH Lab. Cas. V83279 (N.D. Tex. 1965).
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quired to file reports covering all labor relations services, both per-
suader and nonpersuader, rendered to all clients. In both cases it
was held that once any persuader activity was performed, the attorneys
were then required to report information about all labor relations
services rendered to all clients for that annual reporting period.8 Prior
to the instant case, however, no court had considered the applicability
of the 203(c) and 204 exclusionary sections to persuader activities
clearly within section 203(b).
In the instant case, the court first addressed itself to the issue of
whether the admitted9 persuader activities of the plaintiffs were sub-
ject to the reporting requirements of section 203(b). The court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' contention that section 203(b) was not intended
to apply to contemporaneously disclosed and open persuader activity.10
After having determined that the plaintiffs' activities were clearly
within the letter of section 203(b), the court turned to a consideration
of the applicability of the exemptions provided in sections 203(c) and
204. The court first determined that the legislative history" of section
203(c) reflected Congress' view that persuader activity -is readily
distinguishable from other forms of labor relations services, and that
this section was not intended to exempt activities clearly within the
persuader classification. Turning next to section 204, the court again
relied on legislative history to conclude that the section protected the
employer-client relationship only against the disclosure of confidential
information falling within the traditional bounds of the attorney-client
privilege. Since the plaintiffs' admittedly open persuader activities
could not be considered privileged, 12 the court found no barrier in
section 204 to the disclosure of such information. Having found that
the attorneys' persuader activities were not exempted by sections
203(c) or 204, the court then turned to the issue of whether the an-
8. The court in Douglas v. Wirtz, supra note 6, read the act to mean that the
rendering of any non-exempted persuader services "triggered" the reporting require-
ment as to all labor services for all clients.
9. Plaintiffs' activities in question were conceded to be persuader activities for the
purposes of reviewing the lower court's summary judgment.
10. 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (54 CCH Lab. Cas.) ff 11514, at 17668. See S. REP.' No.
187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1959); 99 CoNG. REc. 5976 (1959).
11. 4 CCH LAn. L. REP. (54 CCH Lab. Cas.) ff 11514, at 17667. See 105 CoNG.
REc. 6558 (1959).
12. Consultants must report the name of their client, the receipts and disbursements
pursuant to persuader arrangements and the general nature of their activities in behalf
of these clients. Supra note 1. This information cannot be brought within the tra-
ditional common law privilege which attaches to certain confidential information com-
municated from client to attorney. 8 WmoP, EVmENcE § 2313, at 609 (McNaughton
rev. 1961). This is particularly true in the instant case in light of the plaintiffs' own
assertion that they were performing their persuader activities openly.
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nual report13 had to include services performed for nonpersuader
clients. The court unanimously agreed that the thirty-day reporting
provision did not require reports as to nonpersuader clients, but split
on the issue of whether the annual reporting provision required such
reports. 14 The majority refused to follow the holdings in Douglas v.
Wirtz and Price v. Wirtz, feeling that legislative history required a
contrary decision. It was decided that the annual report need include
only those agreements covered by the thirty-day report. Since the act
clearly did not require the inclusion of information regarding non-
persuader clients in the thirty-day report, the majority concluded that
nonpersuader services need not be reported in the annual report.15
The act clearly requires that all persuader activities must be re-
ported, but there is no certainty as to whether any nonpersuader ac-
tivity need be reported. The lack of conclusive congressional history
and the lack of agreement among commentators 16 is reflected in the
split between the two circuits that have now considered the issue.
Interpreting the language of section 203(b) in light of its stated pur-
poses,17 it appears the act requires a reporting of nonpersuader ac-
13. Section 203(b) requires both a thirty-day report and an annual report. As
explained in the text infra, one issue in the instant case concerns the construction of the
annual reporting provision; the language of the thirty-day reporting provision quite
clearly does not require reports as to all employers, and was not an issue here. See
note 1 supra.
14. The dissenting member of the court would follow Douglas v. Wirtz, supra note
6, and hold that the performance of persuader activities requires an annual report of
all labor relations advice and services rendered on behalf of all clients. For an argu-
ment supporting this view, see Loomis, Employer and Consultant Reporting Require-
ments, in SYMPOsIUM oN Em LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPonTnr AND DIscLosunE ACT OF
1959 391, 399 (Slovenko ed. 1961). The specific problem of statutory construction is
whether the term "employers" found in § 203(b)(2)(A) refers back to the same
class of employers indicated earlier in § 203(b)(2); or whether "employers" is a
general term embracing all employers for whom labor relations activities were per-
formed, without reference back to the persuader employers discussed earlier. Under
the latter construction, the § 203(b)(2)(A) annual reporting provision applies to all
employer-clients, including nonpersuader clients. See Comment, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 366,
at 371 (1965).
15. Also, the majority felt that if one or more instances of persuader activity trigger
the reporting requirement as to all labor relations activity on behalf of nonpersuader
clients, the act would operate unduly harshly upon employer clients and upon attorneys
who rendered only very few persuader services.
16. See Levy, Comment, in SYMPosrm ON ThE LABOR-MANAG-MENT REPonTiNG
AND DiscLosunE AcT OF 1959 417 (Slovenko ed. 1961).
17. There are three purposes of the section as stated in the Senate committee report.
The first is "to prevent, discourage, and make unprofitable improper conduct on the
part of ... employers, and their representatives by requiring reporting of arrangements,
actions and interests which are questionable." S. REP. No. 187, supra note 10, at 12.
The second is to enable employees to make objective evaluations of the diverse pres-
sures being applied to them. Id. at 11. The third is to provide a sound factual basis
for further legislative action if deemed necessary. Id. at 12, 26. While Congress con-
sidered surreptitious, persuader activity improper conduct, it did not consider all per-
suader activity improper. However, since most persdader activity is "disruptive of
harmonious labor relations, the committee believes ... all should be reported." Id. at 12.
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tivities performed for persuader clients 18 but this does necessitate re-
porting nonpersuader activities as to clients for whom no persuader
activity was undertaken.19 Substantially, this is the conclusion of the
court in the instant case, but the opinion is unclear in regard to non-
persuader activities for persuader clients.20 A problem certain to arise
in future litigation under the act is that of distinguishing between "in-
direct persuasion" reportable under section 203(b) and "advice" ex-
empted under section 203(c). For example, it is obvious that when a
lawyer undertakes on behalf of an employer client to address the
client's assembled employees and urges them not to unionize (as was
done in the instant case), he is engaged in reportable activity. It be-
comes less obvious when the lawyer merely drafts a letter to be sent to
the employees urging nonunionization, still less when a lawyer simply
encourages the employer to draft his own letter while setting forth
ideas as to its contents. Most of the activities in the instant case were
clearly persuader, as they were in Douglas and Price, and the court
did not have cause to consider the issue. Legislative history is in-
conclusive and affords no guidelines, but the problem may become a
frequent one if the act's reporting requirements are stringently en-
forced by the Secretary of Labor.
18. This view gives meaning to the requirement in § 203(b) (2) (A) that the annual
report contain a statement of "receipts of any kind from employers on account of labor
relations advice or services .... " For the view that the term "employers" refers to
the same employers mentioned earlier in the section (i.e., those with whom persuader
agreements were undertaken) see note 19 infra.
19. Such an interpretation necessarily presupposes that the term "employers" in §
203(b)(2)(A) refers to those employers who were mentioned earlier in the section
(i.e., those with whom persuader agreements were undertaken). Since nonpersuader
activities were not questionable activities under the statute, and since it is not clear how
disclosure of information as to nonpersuader clients would further the stated purposes
of the provisions, it is submitted that there is no need to require reports of any
attorney as to nonpersuader clients.
20. The instant court merely footnoted the proposition that nonpersuader activity
undertaken in behalf of persuader clients must be reported.
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Labor Law-Employer Must Bargain About an
Economically Motivated Decision To Close
a Portion of Its Operations
Ozark Trailers, Inc., was a member of a multi-corporate, integrated
enterprise' primarily engaged in the manufacture, sale, and service of
refrigerated truck bodies. In January of 1964,2 Ozark's board of direc-
tors decided that economic considerations 3 required the termination of
the operations of the Ozark plant. No notice of this was given the
union, and no opportunity was afforded the union to bargain as to
the decision to close or its consequent effects upon the employees.
After closure, the manufacturing operations previously performed by
Ozark were subcontracted to another company.4 The union filed unfair
labor practice charges, alleging violations of sections 8(a)(1), 5
8(a) (3), 6 and 8(a)(5) 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. The,
Trial Examiner dismissed the 8(a)(3) charge but found Ozark's
refusal to bargain with the union in regard to the decision and its
1. Ozark Trailers, Inc., a Missouri Corporation, was engaged in the business of
manufacturing truck semi-trailers. Mobilefreeze Co. sold custom-built refrigerated
truck bodies. Hutco Equipment Co. engaged in the sale, service, and repair of truck
semi-trailers. Mobilefreeze was the principal source of materials for Ozark; Ozark, in
turn, was engaged almost exclusively in the manufacture of truck bodies for Mobile-
freeze. Hutco provided service and repair work for Mobilefreeze. Three individuals
owned all the common stock of the three corporations, held all their offices, and com-
prised their boards of directors. These three jointly made the decision to terminate
Ozark's operations.
2. On March 1, 1963, Local 770, Allied Industrial Workers, won a Board-conducted
election held at the Ozark plant. This union was subsequently certified as the
exclusive bargaining representative of the Ozark employees on March 11, 1963. The
union and the company formulated a collective bargaining agreement, which was
executed on April 16, 1963, for a term of one year. The decision to close the Ozark
plant was made near the end of January 1964.
3. "[Elxcessive man hours were required for the production of custom refrigerated
truck bodies; the truck bodies produced and sold would not perform properly because
of defective workmanship, necessitating a return of the bodies to the plant at
disastrous expense to Respondents; and the plant facilities were not efficiently laid out."
Ozark Trailers, Inc., 63 L.R.R.M. 1264, 1268 (1966).
4. After the closure, Mobilefreeze contracted out the manufacture of refrigerated
truck bodies, previously done by Ozark, to the Schodorf Body Company of Columbus,
Ohio.
5. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1964): "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer-( 1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees
in the exercise of their rights guaranted in § 7."
6. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964): "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer-(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization ......
7. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964): "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer-(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees ....
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attendant effects violative of sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (5). Upon
recommendation to the NLRB, held, Trial Examiner's findings of unfair
labor practices adopted.8 The employer's economically motivated deci-
sion to terminate a portion of its operations and the subsequent effect
of this decision upon the employees are mandatory subjects of collec-
tive bargaining within the meaning of section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA.
Ozark Trailers, Inc., 63 L.R.R.M. 1264 (N.L.R.B. 1966).
Section 8(a) (5) of the NLRA provides that it shall be an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with
the representatives of his employees... ."9 Section 8(d) defines col-
lective bargaining as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and the... union to meet.., and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. ."...10 While court decisions" have established that the phrase
"other terms and conditions of employment" is to be given a broad
construction, the issue of whether economically motivated operational
changes are within the ambit of this phrase has not been clearly
resolved. This basic question may be subdivided into the employer's
duty to bargain about the effects of an operational change upon em-
ployees and the duty to bargain about the actual decisions to make
such a change. As to the first of these, the Board and the courts have
concluded that the impact upon employee rights resulting from an
operational change is indeed a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing, and that the employer must negotiate such issues as severance
pay, seniority, and pension rights. This was clearly stated in NLRB
v. Rapid Bindery, Inc.,2 and is based upon the proposition that a
curtailment of work directly affects "conditions of employment."
3
Although Rapid Bindery specifically settled the first problem, it has
proved much more difficult to resolve whether the employer is obli-
gated to bargain about the actual decision to make an operational
change. Beginning in 1962 with Town & Country Mfg. Co.,14 the
8. For the full text of the Board's order, see 63 L.R.R.M. 1264, 1270 (1966).
9. 49 State. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
10. 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
11. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948).
12. "[OJnce that decision [to make an operational change] was, made, § 8(a)(5)
requires that notice be given to the union so that the negotiators could then consider
the treatment due to those employees whose conditions of employment would be
radically changed by the move." NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 176
(2d Cir. 1961).
13. Ibid.
14. 136 N.L.R.B. 1022 (1962), enforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963). The
employer subcontracted his hauling operations to deliver trailers to customers. This
was done shortly after the employer learned of the drivers' interest in the union. The
Board, found that the decision, was based on discriminatory motives and therefore
violative of 88 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5). In a significant dictum the Board announced
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Board established its position that an employer must bargain about a
decision to subcontract a part of his operations, despite legitimate
economic motivation. The focal point of the decision was that since
the decision to subcontract resulted in the elimination of jobs, "condi-
tions of employment" were substantially affected.15  Despite the
Board's consistent application of the Town & Country rule, the courts
which have considered the question have limited the scope of this
doctrine.' 6 In the leading case of Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 7 the Supreme Court held that the obligation to bargain in-
cluded bargaining about the decision to subcontract, but limited its
holding to situations where the employer had replaced existing em-
ployees with those of an independent contractor to do the same work
under similar conditions of employment. Furthermore, the Court noted
that: "the Company's decision to contract out the . . .work did
not alter the Company's basic operation. The... work still had to be
performed in the plant. No capital investment was contem-
plated. . . ."8 In a significant concurring opinion, Justice Stewart
asserted that the type of subcontracting presented in the case fell
short of such larger entrepreneurial decisions as determining the goods
to be produced, the investment of capital, and the scope of the enter-
prise. Such decisions, he maintained, do not primarily concern con-
ditions of employment, even though the effect of such decisions bear
an incidental relation to employment security. Attempting to delineate
the scope of Fibreboard, the Eighth Circuit in Adams Dairy" and the
that even if the employer subcontracted his operations for purely economic (and thus
nondiscriminatory) motives, he was still required by § 8(a)(5) to bargain with the
union over his decision to subcontract.
15. "[T]he elimination of unit jobs, albeit for economic reasons, is a matter within
the . . .meaning of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act." Id. at 1027. See Bart & Kingston
The Specter of Darlington-Restrictions on an Employer's Right to Make a Change in
His Business Operations, 8 B. C. IND. & Comm. L. REV. 55, 57-64 (1966).
16. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 545 (1964), remanded, 350 F.2d
191 (3d Cir. 1965), aff'd on remand, 152 N.L.R.B. 619 (1965); Hawaii Meat Co., 139
N.L.R.B. 966 (1962), enforcement denied, 321 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1963); Adams Dairy,
Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 815 (1962), modified and enforced in part, 322 F.2d 553 (8th Cir.
1963), vacated and remanded, 379 U.S. 644 (1965), modified, 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
17. 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), reo'd on rehearing, 138 N.L.R.B. 550 (1962),
enforced, 322 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
18. 379 U.S. at 213.
19. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350 F.2d 108 (8th Cir. 1965). The dairy decided
to liquidate the part of its business which handled the distribution of its milk products
and to distribute its products through independent contractors. The Board held that
the employer was required by § 8(a) (5) to bargain about the decision. On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit held that the dairy's decision to subcontract was not a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining. The court concluded that the case was factually distinguishable
from Fibreboard in that a basic operational change was involved, that the work was not




Third Circuit in Royal Plating20 recently rejected the Board's reliance
on Town & Country. In these two decisions the courts held that
section 8(a) (5) does not proscribe unilateral operational changes
which effect "a major change in the economic direction of the com-
pany" 21 or which involve "a management decision to recommit and
reinvestfunds in the business,"z2 or which result in a "partial liquida-
tion and a recoup of capital investment."23
The Board in the instant case initially determined that the respon-
defnt constituted a single employer within the meaning of the NLRA,
and that, therefore, the closing was a partial, rather than a complete,
termination of operations.24 The Board then considered the question
of whether the employer was obligated to bargain the effects of the
partial closure upon the employees and cited Rapid Bindery in hold-
ing that the employer did have such a duty. In considering whether
the decision to close was itself a mandatory bargaining subject, the
Board reviewed the decisions in Fibreboard, Adams Dairy, and Royal
Plating and determined that the rationale of Fibreboard did not com-
pel the limitations imposed by the two circuit courts. In support of
this conclusion, the Board reasoned that since the Supreme Court in
Fibreboard had regarded the termination of unit jobs as significantly
affecting "conditions of employment," an employer's decision to close
a part of its operations should not be exempt from the requirement to
bargain solely because the decision also concerned the employer's
investment structure.2
20. NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965). The
employer decided to sell a plant and liquidate. No opportunity was given the union to
bargain about this decision. The Board concluded that the employer's conduct resulted
in an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain over the closing of the plant. The Third Circuit,
however, took the contrary view that the employer was not obligated to bargain over
the decision. The court distinguished Fibreboard in noting that the instant situation
involved a managerial decision to recommit and reinvest funds in the enterprise and
a major change in the economic direction of the company.
21. Id. at 196.
22. Ibid.
23. NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., supra note 19, at 111.
24. Regarding the closing as only a partial termination, the Board concluded that
the Darlington principle was not determinative of the issues presented. See Textile
Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965), where it was held that
an employer's decision to close its plant due to unionization is not an unfair labor practice
when the employer goes completely out of business and the sale of the corporation's
plant is entire, bona fide, and irrevocable.
25. "[W]e do not believe that the question whether a particular management deci-
sion must be bargained about should turn on whether the decision involves the
commitment of investment capital, or on whether it may be characterized as involving
'major' or 'basic' change in the nature of the employer's business. True it is that
decisions of this nature are, by definition, of significance for the employer. It is
equally true, however . . . that an employer's decision to make a 'major' change in
the nature of his business . . . is also of significance for those employees whose jobs
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Analytically, the Board's reasoning in the instant case is compelling.
Since a partial closure necessarily involves a loss of jobs and erosion
of seniority rights, there is a direct and legitimate employee interest
in the decision. Moreover, it is irrelevant to this interest that the
decision also involves an alteration in the investment structure of the
company or a basic change in the employer's business. However, in
emphasizing only employee rights, the Board has adopted an approach
which seems inappropriate for meeting the essential problem: how to
accommodate the conflicting interests of labor and management so as
to assure the protection of employee rights, while preserving the
management flexibility and initiative essential to efficient and economic
operation. Proper resolution of this delicate problem requires both a
realistic appraisal of the practical considerations and a balancing of
the competing interests and policies involved. However, the Board's
decision succeeds only in securing the interests of the employees at
the expense of management's freedom to exercise its entrepreneurial
discretion. The requirement that each managerial decision affecting
"conditions of employment" be submitted to the collective bargaining
process would indeed be an intrusion into a province reserved for
employer discretion and would constitute a significant restraint upon
the exercise of management flexibility. A more appropriate reconcilia-
tion of the conflicting employer-employee interests would require
bargaining only as to the effects of an economically motivated partial
closure and thus limit the negotiations to such issues as severance pay,
seniority, and pension rights.26 This compromise would serve as a
more adequate resolution of the essential problem since it would
assure management flexibility while still affording a meaningful
measure of protection to the rights of the employees whose interests
are affected by the decision.
will be lost by the termination. . . . [T]he employee has invested years of his working
life, accumulating seniority, accruing pension rights, and developing skills .... " 63
L.R.R.M. 1264, 1267 (1966).
26. This view is suggested by the implications of the concurring opinion in Fibre-
board, supra note 17, and by the recent decisions in Adams Dairy, supra note 16, and
Royal Plating, supra note 16.
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Labor Law-Employer's Duty To Bargain When
Authorization Cards Are Presented Within Twelve
Months of a Prior Valid Election
Nine months after losing a representation election, the Retail Clerks
Employees Union presented authorization cards from a majority of the
employees of the Great Scott Supermarket and demanded recognition
from the employer as the exclusive bargaining representative of his
employees. Upon the employer's refusal to bargain, the union filed
unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board,
claiming the employer had violated section 8(a) (5)1 of the National
Labor Relations Act.2 Since a valid election had been conducted
nine months prior to the union's demand for recognition, the employer
contended that his duty to bargain was eliminated by section 9(c) (3)3
of the act, which permits only one valid election to be held in any
twelve-month period. The Board held that the employer's refusal to
bargain constituted a violation of section 8 (a) (5) of the act and issued
an order to bargain.4 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, held, enforced. Where a union demands recognition on the
basis of authorization cards signed by a majority of the employees in
the bargaining unit, the employer has a duty to bargain under section
8(a) (5) of the NLRA regardless of a prior valid election within the
preceeding twelve-months. Conren, Inc. v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 173 (7th
Cir. 1966).
Prior to the enactment of the Tart-Hartley amendments to the
NLRA, a union which had lost a representation election could petition
the Board for another election at any time upon a showing of sub-
stantial employee support.5 On the other hand, in the absence of
unusual circumstances, 6 a union which had been certified on the
basis of a Board election could not have its majority status challenged
1. Section 8(a)(5) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to
the provisions of section 9(a)." 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
2. The Board also found violations qf sections 8(a)(1),(2) and (3) as alleged
by the union. Ti court of appeals affrmed these conclusions on the ground. Jthat
there was substantial evidence to support the Board's findings.
3. In pertinent part section 9(c) (3) provides: "No election shall be directed in any
bargaining unit or any subdivision within which, in the precedng twelve-month period, a
valid election shall have been held." 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3)
(1964).
4. Conren, Inc., 61 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1966).
5. E.g., American Tri-State Paper Box Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 126 (1945) (election di-
rected upon presentation of authorization cards 8 months after prior election); Carolina
Panel Co., 62 N.L.R.B. 418 (1945).
6. Century Oxford Mfg. Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 835 (1943). See also Neary, The Union's




by another election for a reasonable time after the date of its certifica-
tion,' generally a year.8 An employer who refused to bargain with
such a union within the certification year committed an unfair labor
practice, even though the union had lost its majority status during that
time.' By adopting this certification-year rule, the Board attempted
to balance the NLRA's policy of promoting industrial stability through
collective bargaining with its equally important policy of guaranteeing
the freedom of choice to employees.10 However, in cases of unusual
circumstances, such as where a newly certified union had become
defunct, or where a schism had occurred,' 2 an exception was made
allowing the employees to exercise their freedom of choice in another
election during the certification year.13 After the enactment of the Taft-
Hartley amendments, which incorporated section 9(c) (3) into the
act, the Board continued to apply its certification-year rule. 14 Even
though the Board has stated that the validity of the certification-year
rule does not depend upon the statutory provision of section 9(c)
(3 ),15 that section has placed two pertinent limitations upon the
Board's previous practices. Where a union loses an election, another
election cannot be held in the same unit within a twelve-month
period.16 Also, in cases involving unusual circumstances, the harsh
effects of the Board's certification-year rule can no longer be remedied
7. This rule which made the date of the certification the beginning of the certifica-
tion year rather than the date of the election was given approval in Brooks v. NLRB,
348 U.S. 96 (1954).
8. After the enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the Board held that in all
cases a reasonable time would be one year from the date of certification. Lift Trucks,
Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 998 (1948).
9. Century Oxford Mfg. Co., supra note 6. In Celanese Corp. of America, 95
N.L.R.B. 664, 672 (1951), the Board defined its certification-year rule. In the absence
of unusual circumstances, there exists an irrebuttable presumption that a union main-
tains its majority status for a period of one year from the date of its certification. After
a year, the presumption of majority status still exists, but it is rebuttable by the em-
ployer. For the interrelation of this rule with the Board's contract bar rules see Neary,
supra note 6.
10. Century Oxford Mfg. Co., supra note 6; Neary, supra note 6.
11. Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 325 (1944) (NLRA purposes de-
feated if election bar applied when certified union defunct).
12. Brightwater Paper Co., 54 N.L.R.B. 1102 (1944) (certification-year rule no
bar where schism occurs).
13. Subsequent elections were also granted where the size of the bargaining unit
had changed substantially during the certification year. Electric Sprayit Co., 67
N.L.R.B. 780 (1946).
14. Mar-Jac Poultry Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 785 (1962) (union granted one year of
bargaining from date of settlement agreement); John Vilicich, 133 N.L.R.B. 2,38 (1961).
15. Ecko Products Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 137 (1957) (certification-year rule within
Board's administrative discretion). See also Brooks v. NLRB, supra note 6.
16. American Bridge Division, United States Steel Corp., 61 L.R.R.M. 1237 (1966)
(§ 9(c) (3) prohibits more than one election per year either for certification or decertifi-
cation). However, the first election must be valid before a subsequent election will be
prohibited. NLBB v. Blades Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1965).
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by a subsequent election during the election-year. 17 However, in
Rocky Mountain Phosphates, Inc., 8 where the previously elected
union had become defunct, the election prohibition of section 9(c) (3)
was held not to apply to other less formal means of selecting a new
collective bargaining representative. The Board held that the outside
union's presentation of authorization cards from a majority of the
employees in the unit placed the employer under a duty to bargain,
regardless of the fact that a valid election had been held in the same
unit within the preceding twelve-month period.19 The Board reasoned
that neither the legislative history20 nor the language of section
9(c) (3) could be interpreted as precluding anything other than a
second election within twelve months of a prior valid election.21 This
interpretation, viewed in conjunction with a 1956 Supreme Court
decision22 which noted that recognition could be gained by means
other than an election, made it clear to the Board that section 9(c) (3)
did not preclude a union, in cases of unusual circumstances, from
gaining representative status on the basis of authorization cards sub-
mitted during the election year.
In the instant case, the court found that the language and legislative
history of section 9(c) (3) clearly indicated congressional awareness of
means other than an election by which bargaining representatives
could be chosen. By limiting the applicability of section 9(c) (3) to
cases involving elections, Congress had therefore tacitly sanctioned
the establishment of the union's majority status within the election
17. Brooks v. NLRB, supra note 7. The Court stated that the remedy of the employer
or the employees in such situations is with the Board and until such a remedy can
be obtained, the employer is under a duty to bargain in good faith with the certified
union.
18. 138 N.L.R.B. 292 (1962).
19. Accord, Majestic Lamp Mfg. Corp., 143 N.L.R.B. 180, 186 (1963) (prohibition
of § 9(c)(3) does not affect the "vitality of section 7 and sections 8 (a)(1) and (5)
and other sections"); Ecko Products Co., supra note 15 (§ 9(c)(3) does not accord
employer a one-year period of "quiet enjoyment").
20. The legislative history of this section is of little assistance in determining its
intended scope. "Section 9(c)(3): This Amendment prevents the Board from
holding elections more often than once a year in any given bargaining unit unless the
results of the first election are inconclusive by reason of none of the competing unions
having received a majority. At present, if the union loses, it may on presentation
of additional membership cards secure another election within a short time, but if it wins
its majority cannot be challenged for a year." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess.
25(1947).
21. Compare the reasoning of the trial examiners in Strydel, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. No.
114, 61 L.R.R.M. 1230 (1966), and Dow Chemical Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 1150, 1965 CCH
LAD. L. RBa . T390. The Board did not adopt either examiner's view of the applicability
of section 9(c)(3), but disposed of the cases without reaching the section 9(c)(3)
questions.
22. United Mine Workers v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 70-72 (1956)
(that union was not eligible under §§ 9(f),(g), and (h) for certification was no
defense to refusal to bargain charge since union had a majority).
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year by such other means as authorization cards. Thus, the court
concluded that the employer's refusal to bargain with the representa-
tive established by the authorization cards violated section 8(a)(5)
of the act. In his dissenting opinion, judge Kiley contended that
informal methods of selecting a bargaining representative have been
found to be unreliable due to the sensitive situation that prevails
shortly after an election. Thus, he urged that the maintenance of
industrial peace and the protection of the employees' freedom of
choice required that the result of a prior election be given priority
over authorization cards obtained shortly thereafter.
The Conren court has extended judicial approval of the Board's
policy of permitting authorization cards to be used as the basis of an
order to bargain pursuant to section 8(a) (5) of the act. Previously,
the Board held that an order to bargain could be issued on the
basis of a majority of authorization cards presented prior to a lost
election.23 According to the doctrine of this earlier case, if the em-
ployer engages in unfair labor practices during the period between a
demand for recognition and the election, a presumption may be estab-
lished that the employer's initial refusal to bargain was made in bad
faith as an attempt to undermine the union's majority. If the employer
fails to rebut this presumption, an order to bargain will issue.2 "
The instant case now permits a union to seek an order to bargain on
the basis of authorization cards presented within one year after a valid
election, even though the employer has not engaged in unfair labor
practices prior to this election. If an employer has a good faith doubt
of the union's majority status as shown by authorization cards pre-
sented within twelve months of a prior valid election, he is prevented
by section 9(c) (3) from resolving his doubt by insisting on a sub-
sequent election and is thus placed in the dilemma of risking a
violation of section 8(a) (5) by refusing to bargain or bargaining re-
gardless of his good faith doubt. His situation is made more difficult
by the doubtful reliability of the use of authorization cards25 and the
23. Bernel Foam Products Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964).
24. Drug King, Inc., 61 L.R.R.M. 1359 (1966). To give rise to the presumption
of bad faith, the employer's unfair labor practice must be of a substantial nature.
Duther, Inc., 61 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1966). See also Randall, The NLRBs' New Policy
on Bargaining Orders Following Representation Elections, 52 A.B.A.J. 1038 (1966);
Shuman, Requiring a Union to Demonstrate Its Majority Status By Means of an
Election Becomes Riskier, 16 LAB. L.J. 426 (1965); Note, Refusal-to-Recognize Charges
Under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLBA: Card Checks and Employee Free Choice, 33
U. Ca. L. REv. 387 (1966); Note, Union Authorization Cards, 75 YALE L.J. 805
(1966).
25. The reliability of using authorization cards to reflect the employee's choice has
been a subject of much doubt. The open solicitation of such cards presents many
opportunities for coercion and misunderstanding. Employees may be subjected to "band-
wagon" psychology and other conditions which prevent them from making an en-
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Board's liberal policy in validating these cards.2 6 Aside from its
practical difficulties, this decision also presents a questionable in-
terpretation of section 9(c) (3) of the act. Congress has attempted
in section 9(c)(3) to promote industrial peace by preventing
the "constant stirring up of excitement by continual elections"; 27
and to accomplish this purpose, Congress has chosen to require twelve
months between elections. This time period was also used when
section 8(b) (7) (B),28 which prevents recognitional or organizational
picketing by a union within a year of a prior election, was added to
the act. Thus, there appears to be a congressional policy to promote
industrial peace and protect the freedom of choice of the employees
by requiring the expiration of a particular period of time after a valid
election before another opportunity to select a bargaining representa-
tive is offered employees. The use of authorization cards within
twelve months of a prior election conflicts with this policy as much
as a subsequent election since both methods may lead to industrial
unrest and jeopardize the employees' freedom of choice.
lightened choice. Thus, this method of designating a representative does not afford the
employee the privacy and freedom of the secret ballot in making his choice. Viewing
these inherent defects in conjunction with the Board's liberal view in validating these
cards, as expressed in Cumberland Shoe Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963), many of
the doubts may be well founded. See, e.g., Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization
Cards in Determining Union Majority, 16 LAB. LJ. 434 (1965); Note, Refusal-to-
Recognize Charges Under Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA: Card Checks and Employee
Free Choice, supra note 24.
26. See Cumberland Shoe Corp., supra note 25 (use of same authorization cards
for election and designation of representatives).
27. Statement by Senator Taft, 93 CONG. REc. 3838 (1947).
28. 73 Stat. 544 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (B) (1964).
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Taxation-Computation of Corporate Earnings and
Profits-Cash Basis Corporation Cannot Deduct
Federal Taxes Due but Yet Unpaid
In 1959, total rental payments of 132,592.57 dollars were received
by petitioner's real estate corporation and an "experimental depart-
ment," an organization solely owned and controlled by petitioner.'
Neither the real estate corporation nor the petitioner reported such
amounts in their 1959 return. Respondent asserted a deficiency for the
total amount, claiming that all sums received by the department and
the real estate corporation were received by petitioner as a constructive
dividend and therefore taxable to him as ordinary income. Taxpayer
contended that 1959 current year's earnings and profits must be re-
duced by the amount of corporate income tax due in order to de-
termine the amount actually received by him as a dividend.2 Re-
spondent argued that since the real estate corporation was a cash basis
taxpayer it could not reduce current year's earnings and profits by in-
come taxes paid in subsequent years. Held, judgment for respondent.
A cash basis corporation cannot deduct federal taxes due but not yet
paid in computing current year's earnings and profits. Joseph B. Fer-
guson, 47 T.C. 11 (1966).
Although the law is fairly well settled that an accrual basis corpo-
ration may reduce current year's earnings and profits by the amount of
federal taxes due but not yet paid 3 and may even deduct the amount
of a contested tax liability4 or a subsequently determined deficiency,5
1. Petitioner owned an automobile dealership and all the stock of a corporation
which owned certain real estate used in the automobile business. Petitioner sold his
automobile business to "Enterprises," a corporation owned by unrelated persons, under
an agreement requiring Enterprises to pay a minimum of $75,000 annually to petitioner's
real estate corporation with any excess up to 3% of Enterprises' gross sales to be paid
to an "experimental department." The Tax Court found that the "experimental de-
partment" was solely owned and controlled by petitioner on the basis of his complete
control and discretion over the use of department funds and the fact that he could
terminate the department at will and receive all its assets. The owners of Enterprises
also testified that they considered the so-called department as in substance owned by
petitioner and the percentage of gross sales payments as rent.
2. Petitioner argued alternatively that the real estate corporation was an accrual basis
taxpayer but that even if it was a cash basis taxpayer 1959 earnings and profits should
still be reduced by 1959 taxes. The court determined that the real estate corporation
was in fact a cash basis taxpayer.
3. E.g., Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931); United
States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926).
4. E.g., Stem Bros. & Co., 16 T.C. 295 (1951), acq., 1951-2 Cum. BULL. 4.
5. Estate of Esther M. Stein, 25 T.C. 940 (1956), acq., 1957-1 CXir. BuL. 5, 1957-2
CUM But.. 7 (taxpayer allowed to reduce earnings and profits by the subsequently
determined deficiency and the 50% fraud additions). The Commissioner has adopted
Stein, Rev. Rul. 57-332, 1957-2 Cum. BuLL. 231, revoking Rev. Rul. 107, 1953-1
Cum. BuLL. 178. But see Bernstein v. United States, 234 F.2d 475, 482 (5th Cir.
1956) (dictum, criticizing Stein).
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the cases dealing with cash basis corporations are in conflict. The
Commissioner has long asserted that a cash basis corporation cannot
deduct federal taxes in determining current year's earnings and profits.6
However, the first case to consider this issue held that a cash basis
corporation could deduct the tentative tax liability in determining the
amount of earnings available for distribution of dividends.7 The Board
of Tax Appeals followed this decision in M. H. Alworth Trust,8 reason-
ing that the purpose of the rule allowing dividends to be distributed
only out of earnings and profits was to prevent impairment of capital
and that "to permit the distribution of gross earnings and profits with-
out making allowance for outstanding obligations would leave such
obligations as a charge on capital regardless of the method by which
the corporation keeps its books and reports its income."9 The Board
noted that earnings and profits have never been computed in the
same manner as gross income and concluded that there was nothing in
the statute to indicate that Congress intended to depart from the
commonly accepted meaning given to earnings and profits under
general corporation law.10 The Eighth Circuit reversed the Board"
stating that the Board's decision amounted to a limitation on the
statute 2 to the effect that taxable dividends could arise only if there
were earnings and profits remaining after deducting federal taxes for
that year; it concluded that such a limitation was not intended by
Congress. This decision was subsequently followed without question
by the Tax Court.13 The Sixth Circuit, however, took the opposite view
in Drybrough v. Commissioner.4 There the court stated that "whether
6. G. C. M. 2951, VII-1 Cum. BULL. 160 (1928). The Commissioner's assertion is
based upon Treas. Reg. § 1.312-6(a) (1955): "Earnings and Profits. (a) . . . the
amount of earnings and profits in any case will be dependent upon the method of
accounting properly employed in computing taxable income . . . . For instance, a
corporation keeping its books and filing its income tax returns . . . on the cash receipts
and disbursements basis may not use the accrual basis in determining earnings and
profits .. " (Emphasis added.)
7. Hadden v. Commissioner, 49 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1931).
8. 46 B.T.A. 1045 (1942), reto'd, 136 F.2d 812 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
784 (1943).
9. 46 B.T.A. at 1047.
10. M. H. Aiworth was followed in John H. Wheeler, 1 T.C. 640 (1943), rev'd,
143 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1944) (without discussion of this issue), rev'd, 324 U.S. 542
(1945) (without discussion of this issue). It should be noted that Wheeler was decided
while Alworth was pending appeal in the Eighth Circuit.
11. Helvering v. Alworth, 136 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1943). The court refuted the
Board's reliance on general corporate law concepts stating that the statute does not
refer to the power of a corporation to distribute its earnings to shareholders, but
relates only to what must be included in the shareholder's gross income.
12. NT. Bv. CODE OF 1939, § 115(a) (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 316(a)).
13. United Mercantile Agencies, 23 T.C. 1105 (1955), rev'd sub nom., Drybrough
v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1956); Paulina duPont Dean, 9 T.C. 256
(1947).
14. 238 F.2d 735, 32 No= DAm LAw. 739 (1957).
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a corporation keeps its accounts and makes its returns on the cash or
accrual basis is a question generally relevant only in determining its
own income and deductions as a taxpayer," but not in computing earn-
ings and profits.15 The court adopted the reasoning of the Board's
opinion in Alworth and concluded that to hold otherwise would consti-
tute a tax on the distribution of capital.16 Drybrough was subsequently
followed in three jurisdictions,17 including the Tax Court, and the
Eighth Circuit.19 However, just when it appeared that all the courts
were finally in agreement on this issue, the Tax Court again reversed
its position and in Newark Amusement Corp.2 specifically followed the
Eighth Circuit's decision in Alworth. The most recent case to consider
the issue was Demmon v. United States,2' which introduced a new
argument as to why cash basis corporations should be allowed to de-
duct accrued but unpaid taxes from earnings and profits. The court
quoted Internal Revenue Code section 316(a) 22 and stated that this
15. 238 F.2d at 738.
16. The court concluded that "both common sense and realism require the conclusion
that corporate taxes ... should be excluded from the corporation's earnings and profits
under the circumstances of this case." 238 F.2d at 740. The court also allowed the
fraud additions to be deducted.
17. Demmon v. United States, 321 F.2d 203 (7th Cir. 1963), 5 B.C. IND. & COM,
L. REv. 470 (1963); Simon v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 869 (8th Cir. 1957), reversing
United States Packing Co., 24 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 653 (1955); Thompson v. United
States, 214 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Robert L. Bender, 16 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
502, 518 (1957).
18. Robert L. Bender, supra note 17. Although the Tax Court followed Drybrough
and Stein in allowing deduction of a subsequently determined deficiency and fraud
additions, the court did not indicate what method of accounting the corporation was
using. Thompson v. United States notes this fact in citing Bender but states that "the
long discussion does appear to indicate that it was on a cash basis." Supra note 17, at
100. Also, the type of business (taxicab and limousine service) and the fact that the
principal sbareholder-offcer kept cash receipts books would indicate cash basis.
19. Simon v. Commissioner, supra note 17. The court did not mention Alworth but
specifically followed Drybrough in holding that a cash basis corporation could deduct
fraud additions.
20. 19 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 705 (1960).
21. Supra note 17. In Demmon, the Commissioner relied upon the following language
in Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948), upholding
the validity and reasonableness of what is now Treas. Reg. 1-312(6)(a) (1955):
"This regulation is in harmony with the long-established congressional policy that a
taxpayer generally cannot compute income taxes by reporting annual income on a cash
basis and deductions on an accrual basis." However, the Demmon, court distinguished
South Texas Lumber Co. stating that that case pertained to computation of the corporate
income taxes while Demmon and similar cases deal only with the computation of
earnings and profits. Demmon v. United States, supra note 17, at 206. This narrow
construction of South Texas Lumber Co. has been criticized. Gardner, The Tax Con-
sequences of Shareholder Diversions in Close Corporations, 21 TAx L. Rlv. 22,3, 249
n.99 (1966).
22. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, § 316(a): "Dividend Defined .... any distribution
made by a corporation ... out of its earnings and profits of the taxable year (computed
as of the close of the taxable year ... )"- (Emphasis added.)
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statute requires all corporations to compute earnings and profits as
of one time regardless of their method of accounting.2
In the instant case the Tax Court conceded that current year's earn-
ings and profits are not necessarily synonymous with taxable income2
and that "there is no statute or inescapable rule of logic which re-
quires strict adherence to the cash basis for earnings and profits pur-
poses."25 Nevertheless, the court reasoned, the provisions of Treasury
Regulation 1.312-6(a) do establish this requirement. Since the regula-
tion has a "sound basis in administrative policy," and since there are
no persuasive reasons for departing from the cash basis method for
purposes of computing earnings and profits, the regulation should not
be ignored.
2 6
The Tax Court in the instant case has firmly committed itself to a
position contrary to that taken by the majority of the federal courts
which have considered this issue2 7 The opinion is subject to the same
basic deficiency found in nearly every decision rendered since the
Board's decision in Alworth, that is, it states the desired conclusion
without advancing adequate reasons or analysis in support. A major
reason for the present dilemma is that neither the statute, the regula-
tions nor the court decisions give a comprehensive definition of "earn-
ings and profits," thereby placing the burden on the individual tax-
payer to determine, often at his peril, the composition of earnings and
23. "These words must mean that all corporations whether cash, accrual or hybrid,
compute earnings and profits as of one time-the close of the taxable year. Such
words imply accrual-'as of' means tax relating to the year, and not tax incidentally
paid during the year involved for some previous year or years." Demmon v. United
States, supra note 17, at 206. The court did not expand on this argument, and as a
result this statement has been criticized for stating a conclusion without an analysis
of the items which compose earnings and profits. Merely "requiring all corporations to
compute earnings and profits at one time is not the same as requiring all corporations
to treat each item in that computation in the same manner." Gardner, supra note 21,
at 249.
24. The court noted exceptions contained in Treas. Reg. 1.312-6(b)(c) (1955),
such as interest received on tax exempt bonds which are not included in taxable income
yet must be included in earnings and profits. Nearly all authorities agree that taxable
income and earnings and profits are not synonymous; see, e.g., Commissioner v. Wheeler,
324 U.S. 542, 546 (1945).
25. 47 T.C. at 33.
26. The court noted the split of authority and reviewed the decisions considering
the primary issue, concluding that after being reversed by the Eighth Circuit in
Alworth the Tax Court has consistently followed the reversal and that there was no
reason why it should not adhere to the same view in this case. However, the court
completely ignored its prior decision in Robert L. Bender, supra note 17, just as it did
in Newark Amusement Corp., supra note 20.
27. It is difficult to determine just what the present position of the Eighth Circuit
is in view of its decision in Simon v. Commissioner, supra note 17. The Simon court
ignored Alworth just as the Tax Court has ignored Bender.
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profits.2  There is also disagreement as to whether "earnings and
profits" is primarily a statutory concept2 9 or an accounting concept
subject to general accounting principles.30 As one writer has observed:
"The sum of the issue is a conflict between the Treasury's desire to
have conformity within a given corporate entity for all purposes re-
lated to taxation; and the businessman's drive to reflect as clearly as
possible, at any given point in time, present net worth of the corpora-
tion."3 There appears to be no logical reason why the method of ac-
counting utilized should dictate the deduction of tax liability in de-
termining earnings and profits. General accounting practice and
common sense would seem to require deduction of tax liability in
determining the amount of distributable dividends out of current year's
earnings and profits.3 2 Moreover, the policy of not allowing a cash basis
corporation to deduct due but unpaid taxes promotes a gross unfair-
ness among taxpayers in that such a policy allows the government to
collect a double tax on the total amount of current year's earnings
and profits by first taxing the cash basis corporation on the total
amount at corporate rates and then taxing the shareholder on the same
amount as ordinary income.P No such harsh result obtains for corpora-
28. See, e.g., Brrrxxn & EusTIcE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ConPoAvxONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS ff 5.03 (2d ed. 1966); Schwanbeck, The Accountant's Problem in Work-
ing With "Earnings and Profits" for Tax Purposes, 10 J. TAXATiON 22 (1959). One
authority often cited for a general discussion of earnings and profits is Rudick, "Divi-
dends" and "Earnings or Profits" Under the Income Tax Law: Corporate Non-Liquidat-
ing Distributions, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1941). See also Albrecht, "Dividends" and
"Earnings or Profits," 7 TAx L. REv. 157 (1952).
29. 1 MERzns, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATiON ff 9.28 (rev. ed. 1962); Zarky & Biblin,
The Role of Earnings and Profits in the Tax Law, 1966 So. CAL. TAx INsT. 145, 159;
19 J. TAxATION 263 (1963).
30. Commissioner v. James, 49 F.2d 707, 708 (2d Cir. 1931): "In employing the
phrase 'earnings and profits' . . . we think Congress intended the use of the term
in the ordinary accounting understanding . . .. This statement has been criticized
as "unquestionably too broad." 1 MERTENs, op. cit supra note 29 n.78; Smux &
WAREN, FEDERAL INcoM TAXATiON 1238 (1960 ed.) ("The earnings and profits of a
year ... are based upon actual net income and expenses. The concept is much closer
to the actual increase in earned surplus determined by the accountant than to taxable
income."); Emmanuel, Earnings and Profits; an Accounting Concept?, 4 TAx L. REV.
494, 498 (1949).
31. Gardner, supra note 21, at 250.
32. Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, supra note 3, at 378: "[W]hile the taxes
for any year are not payable until the following year, good accounting practice requires
an accrual of them as a liability of the current year's business. . . ." See also Com-
missioner v. James, supra note 30, at 708. It should be noted that both these cases
concerned accrual basis taxpayers. But see Hadden v. Commissioner, supra note 7, at
712 (same reasoning with respect to a cash basis taxpayer).
33. Assuming no deductions or credits, suppose a corporation has current year's
earnings and profits of $100,000 and the corporate tax liability is $40,000. The share-
holder of a cash basis corporation (who receives the whole amount as a constructive
dividend) would have to pay taxes on $100,000 as ordinary income or approximately
$55,500, whereas the shareholder of an accrual basis corporation would pay taxes on
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tions employing the accrual method. Finally, this policy may result
in impairment of capital.34 As the Tax Court and the circuit courts
appear hopelessly split on the issue, a comprehensive definition of
"earnings and profits" is badly needed. However, it appears that any
effective definition will properly have to come from Congress and not
the courts.
only $60,000 ($100,000 less $40,000) or approximately $28,800, a difference of $26,300.
Unless earnings and profits are the same amount each year, a distortion will always
exist as to the actual earnings and profits for the cash basis corporation.
34. E.g., Drybrough v. Commissioner, supra note 13. Had the corporation not been
allowed to deduct the deficiencies and fraud additions from current year's earnings
and profits, it would have been rendered insolvent.
